focus on the current operational needs, funding becomes potential obstacles on all fronts. The funding concern, to include the rising national debt, reflects the reality of limited resources and the methodology for obtaining resources. As a result, Network Centric Warfare is struggling for valuable resources and may falter due to the de-synchronization of intra-dependent programs.
Network Centric Warfare entails several major acquisition programs with transformation technology. The following analysis provides a microscopic slice of the Defense Department's transformational concepts for the military. The Army's Future Combat System serves as an excellent case study for reviewing some key elements of defense transformation and the feasibility of funding network centric operations. This paper examines issues with the processes for obtaining the necessary resources to include the complexities of transforming a military service. Finally, the paper provides recommendations on ensuring the successful implementation of the transformation objectives.
With the arrival of the Bush Administration in 2000, As a technology-driven program, this ripple continues into the development of software.
Based on the myriad of Future Combat System requirements, it will require an order of magnitude more lines of code than any known program within the Defense Department. The complexity and interoperability of linking many diverse subsystems leads to a high risk of large, non-linear cost growth and beyond those of past systems. 16 This fact was acknowledged in an independent assessment panel conclusion that "software development is judged to be the greatest cost and schedule risk to the program." 17 Additionally, the interoperability requirement suggests over a million source line of code based on a simple order-of magnitude estimate and an increase in the total life-cycle costs. 18 Again, this raises the potential risk for increased operating and support cost based on the projection of 50 percent to 75 percent of total software life-cycle costs. 19 The other significant cost driver, in ensuring the mobile networking capabilities for the Future Combat System program, is the personnel and logistical support based on the system's technical demands. Embracing the network-centric nature of the future operational environment, all personnel will require extensive hours of training for both operators and technicians. The cutting-edge nature of the technology implies the need for continuous specialized training based on the upgrading of software throughout the system. 20 This is another area for potential increase in cost. Table 2 Our goal is not simply to fight and win wars; it is to try to prevent wars. To do so, we need to find ways to influence the decision-makers of potential adversaries, to deter them not only from using existing weapons, but to the extent possible, try to dissuade them from building dangerous new capabilities in the first place. Just as the existence of the U.S. Navy dissuades others from investing in competing navies-because it would truly cost them a fortune and would not succeed in providing the margin of military advantage-we must develop new capabilities that merely by our possessing them will dissuade adversaries from trying to compete. 29 While the above shows the long-term competition for funds, the other red herring is daily operations and supplemental funding to prosecute the war on terrorism for the military element … you know we accelerated the FCS Program. Now, we say we accelerate it. What we are doing is spiraling maturing technologies out of the Future Combat Systems Program on to the current force... So as we can spiral technologiesand it's not just battle command, and it's not just digits. It's things like on the UAVS that we can tie down to tactical levels, for things like radios and common ground stations so that we can have better joint connectivity and nodes-'cause we do this. It enables our current force in ways that starts acting like the future modular force. And, therefore, we start organizing. We start developing the doctrine. We start training the soldiers and leaders to act like we want them to lead in this future force as part of the transformational path...
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This approach enables the Army to employ available parts of the Future Combat System to today's units, provide time for testing and development of the more challenging parts and effective manage the cost and technical risk of the program. Army's digitization efforts, the acquisition of hardware for network centric warfare faces termination or delays during each yearly budgetary cycle. As with any complex system, the interwoven parts require balance application for seamless function as a whole. The adjustment of any one area, of the complex system, mandates a reactive correction for maintaining overall balance and efficient operations. Returning to the system thinking approach, the long-term requires orientation toward the systems viewpoint of understanding the relationship of each component, delays and feedback loops. While fixing problems in a vacuum (independent elements) or for the short-term, they may return with haunting results to the holistic effort. 35 As such the primary areas for notable improvement are a portfolio management funding strategy, the total buy-in of the system (strategy) and articulation of strategy beyond the procurement of hardware. This section will review the aforementioned areas for improvement. Returning to the case of the Future Combat System, the Army's effort focuses on future requirements for rapid deployment and maintaining its lethality in combat. With new technologies, this program promotes mobile formations, information sharing and the flexibility for employment across the spectrum of conflict for land-based operations. 40 However, the requirement to fund short-term needs places the Future Combat System into a yearly fight of maintaining its limited resources. Despite the counter-intuitive process, this stove-piped Cold
War-centric application of the PPBES 41 remains the primary tool for funding a multi-faceted interdependent strategy. In an effort to work within the paradigm, the Army restructured the Future Combat System away from the classic large complex acquisition into a spiral approach.
Simply, the Army changed its funding management of the Future Combat System. This construct allows for subset delivery of the system in four spiral phases. Besides reducing the acquisition risk and cost, it provides more capability to the current force (shortterm) and enables continued development for the Future Force (long-term). 42 Although the entire system requires eighteen subsystems coupled with the network and soldier, another examination of Table 2 reveals a systemic approach toward the core development of the Future
Combat System. This model of funding limits the protectionism of the stove-pipe, singular procurement of thing and embraces a move toward portfolio management. 43 Using portfolio management, total system becomes the primary effort. Plus, it links the entire portfolio's entities with the vision, mission, goals and priorities for the desired capability of the overall system-not a stove-piped component. 44 Additionally, the complexities of one portfolio with another reaches a level of simplification and enables more insight into the overall balance of system from both internal and external environments. In essence, it informs the PPBES process of the consequences related to the yearly shifting resources with a system-of-system perspective in comparison to the stove-piped review of individual programs.
The final element in developing a valid funding strategy is realistic estimates. This activity requires the honest and realistic expectations of both the government and the defense industry.
Since 2004, the Government Accountability Office and the numerous acquisition reports voiced concerns about a 63 percent increase in the program's cost. 45 Despite the debates from the government and the Future Combat System's contracting team, the independent assessment in Table 1 highlights a number of concerns for working toward a realistic estimate from the beginning of the program. Unfortunately, the Future Combat System, like other major procurement program, are lacking in their initial cost estimation. Couple with program restructuring and technical challenges, the bottom line is increased cost and hard decisions on the affordability of the program. The current funding strategy of the Future Combat System (Table 2) Instead, it reflects the thinking of the senior civilian and the military leaders…". 58 The ability to deliver transformational capabilities remain one of high optimism and expectations; despite, the evidence of delays, funding shortfalls and immaturity of critical technology found in numerous core programs or systems-of-systems. At this point, the price tag factor remains the most challenging factor to the transformation paradigm. The current funding strategy creates significant hurdles in reaching the end state and requires a transformational approach-as with the Future Combat System. Without a change in funding strategy, network centric warfare will lose it momentum and suffer many programs cuts, which lead down the road of termination.
